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Introduction 
The brand new headquarters of the African Un-
ion in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa opened 
on 28 January 2012. The 20-storey building, with 
a conference room that can seat 2500, was fi-
nanced by the Chinese government and built by 
a Chinese company at a cost of US$ 200 million. 
Top political advisor Jia Qinglin, who represented 
President Hu Jintao at the opening ceremony, 
spoke of a Chinese gift to Africa that symbolized 
the strong ties between the Asian giant and the 
African continent. 
 
 
The late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles 
Zenawi praised the Chinese economic model, 
proclaiming it as an example for Africa. Accord-
ing to Zenawi, the Western economic cure of the 
late 1990s was worse than the disease itself and 
Africa has been doing much better economically 
since economic cooperation with China began. 
The days when Europe and the US dominated 
international relations in Africa are gone and 
China and other emerging powers, like Brazil and 
India, have recently become important trading 
partners, investors and political friends of Africa. 
It is not clear when the first contacts between 
China and Africa started. Ivory traders from an 
area in what is now Kenya and Tanzania are 
mentioned in Chinese writings from the 9th cen-
tury but three large naval expeditions commis-
sioned by the Ming Emperors in the 15th century 
definitely visited East Africa, returning to Beijing 
with a number of giraffes. Contacts with Africa 
were sporadic until the People’s Republic of 
China was formally established in 1949. China’s 
interest in Africa was then mostly politically moti-
vated, with Beijing seeking its support for interna-
tional recognition of China as the only legitimate 
government of China and with Taiwan as just 
one of its provinces. The one-China policy has 
meant that Beijing can only have diplomatic rela-
tions with countries that recognize it as China’s 
legitimate government. There are currently 49 
African countries that have diplomatic relations 
with Beijing. 
China supported anti-colonial liberation 
movements in Africa in the past, partly inspired 
by the Cold War with the US and rivalry with the 
Soviet Union over leadership of the Communist 
world. The financing and construction of the TA-
ZARA railway in 1976, which connects Zambian 
mines with the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanza-
nia, was a symbol of Chinese support for African 
independence. The 1800-km railway reduced 
Zambian dependency on Rhodesia (now Zim-
babwe) for its copper exports. 
The principles of political equality, respect for 
sovereignty and non-interference in domestic af-
fairs date from 1954. China’s ‘no strings at-
tached’ policy distinguishes it from Western 
countries in Africa and has attracted criticism 
from different sides, especially the US and 
Europe. China is criticized for doing business 
with pariah states, like Sudan and Zimbabwe, 
that violate human rights on a massive scale and 
are boycotted by the West. Most African gov-
ernments, however, appreciate China’s ‘no 
strings attached’ approach that ignores political 
conditions like good governance and anti-
corruption measures. 
 
Trade 
Relations between China and Africa have intensi-
fied since the end of the Cold War. A pragmatic 
business relationship has replaced the political 
ideology that characterized earlier relations. Why 
is China so active in Africa today? Basically be-
cause it needs natural resources, export markets 
for its businesses and political support. After 
three decades of rapid economic growth, Chi-
nese demands for energy, metals, minerals and 
food have risen exponentially and the country is 
now importing large quantities of oil, copper, tim-
ber and other raw materials to meet its growing 
ASC Infosheet 13b/2012 
www.ascleiden.nl 
demands. A major share of the energy and raw 
materials is used to manufacture goods that are 
then exported to the US and Europe. 
According to the International Energy Agency, 
China will need to import 79% of its oil needs in 
2030 (Figure 1). Africa is a major supplier of oil, 
with Angola and Sudan being among China’s 
leading suppliers. Africa’s share of China’s global 
oil imports was 32% in 2010 (Figure 2). 
  
   
   
   
 
  
 
 Source Figures 1 and 2: Jiang, Julie and Sinton, J. (2011) ‘Over- 
 seas Investments by Chinese National Oil Companies’,  
 OECD/International Energy Agency, Paris.   
   
   
 
  
   
 
 Source: Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic  
 Cooperation (2011), China-Africa trade and economic  
 relationship. Annual report 2010. 
 
Trade between China and Africa was modest 
in 1960, amounting to a total value of US$ 100 
million. By 1980, the figure stood at US$ 1 billion 
and since 2000 trade has grown even more 
quickly to reach US$ 127 billion in 2010 (Figure 
3). China has been Africa’s largest single-country 
trading partner since 2009, with only the EU be-
ing bigger. Trade with Africa is less important for 
China though and Africa accounted for only 3.8% 
of all China’s exports in 2010. Its share of 
China’s imports was only slightly higher at 4.5%. 
Trade between China and Africa was on the 
whole fairly balanced between 2000 and 2010. 
Chinese imports were as big as Chinese exports 
to Africa but there were huge differences be-
tween countries. Oil-exporting countries, like An-
gola and Sudan, have a large trade surplus with 
China, while resource-poor countries have a 
trade deficit. Chinese imports consist primarily of 
oil and other raw materials but their exports are 
more diverse and include, for example, clothing, 
electronic items, machines and telecom equip-
ment. 
China-Africa trade has fuelled economic 
growth in some African countries, where they 
have benefited from higher commodity prices 
due to increased demand from China. African 
consumers have profited from the import of 
cheap ‘Made in China’ products. African manu-
facturers, on the other hand, are having a difficult 
time competing with Chinese products. 
Trade relations are also a source of tension. 
South Africa’s Trade Minister, Rob Davies, has 
publicly stated that Africa should not be depend-
ent on exports of raw materials but should pro-
duce manufactured goods for its domestic and 
foreign markets. At the World Economic Forum in 
2011, China’s former Special Envoy to Africa, Liu 
Guijin, acknowledged the problem and promised 
Chinese support for industrialization policies in 
Africa. 
 
Investments 
Chinese investment in Africa is still modest in 
size but is growing rapidly (Figure 4). The blue 
column represents the annual flow of foreign di-
rect investment (FDI), which peaked in 2008. The 
red column represents the total value of invest-
ments in Africa in any given year. The official fig-
ures provided by the Chinese Ministry of Com-
merce do, however, need to be treated with cau-  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Edinger, H. & C. Pistorius, ‘Aspects of Chinese invest- 
 ment in the African resources sector’, The Journal of the Southern  
 African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 111 (July 2011). 
 
Figure 1: Chinese oil production and import 
in the long run
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tion as the real level of investment is probably 
much higher as the Ministry’s figures only include 
investments that have been approved by the 
Chinese government. 
Where does Chinese FDI go? It was received 
by 47 countries in Africa between 2003 and 
2010, with the most important destinations being 
South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Zambia, DR 
Congo and Sudan. Together they received 78% 
of all Chinese FDI. The mining sector received 
the largest share of FDI in 2009 followed by 
manufacturing, construction and the financial 
sector (Figure 5). 
 
 
 Source: State Council of the People’s Republic of China, ‘China- 
 Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation’, Information Office of  
 the State Council, Beijing (December 2010). 
 
Chinese investment in Africa is embedded in 
its official ‘Go Out’ policy that was initiated in 
1999. The Chinese government encourages 
companies to invest abroad, increase their ac-
cess to and control of natural resources, diversify 
their products and markets, and become world-
class multinationals. Forty-six Chinese compa-
nies made the Fortune Global 500 list of biggest 
companies in 2010. The state-owned oil com-
pany Sinopec was ranked seventh. By compari-
son, only three Chinese companies made the 
same list in 1994. 
The two state banks, China Export and Import 
Bank (Exim Bank) and the China Development 
Bank (CDB), are the biggest backers of the inter-
nationalization of Chinese companies. Exim 
Bank extended US$ 67.2 billion in loans for pro-
jects in Sub-Saharan Africa between 2001 and 
2010, while the World Bank provided loans of 
US$ 54.7 billion in the same period. 
Chinese economic diplomacy actively sup-
ports the country’s Go Out policy. The Forum for 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which has 
been convened every three years since 2000, 
offers a stage for negotiations and the closing of 
business deals. For example, at the 2006 FO-
CAC meeting in Beijing, US$ 1.9 billion worth of 
trade and investment deals were concluded. 
It is the large state-owned energy, mining and 
construction companies that are benefitting the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
most from China’s Go Out policy and have ac-
cess to Exim Bank and CDB loans. The role 
played by privately owned companies in the Chi-
nese economy and FDI is growing and is likely to 
continue in the future. 
 
Aid 
China is being portrayed in the media as Africa’s 
new, large donor. This is not the case. China’s 
aid to Africa started with its support for Egypt in 
1956, and the TAZARA railway, the largest single 
foreign-aid project at its time, was an early sym-
bol of China’s aid to Africa. In fact, China was 
giving aid to more countries in Africa than the US 
was in 1975. 
The Chinese government provides little in-
formation about its foreign-aid donations. A 2011 
White Paper estimated that its total foreign aid 
stood at US$ 38 billion between 1950 and 2009. 
And although there is no official figure for Chi-
nese aid to Africa for 2009, it is thought to 
amount to between US$ 1.4 and US$ 2 billion. 
By comparison, US aid stood at US$ 7.2 billion 
and the World Bank allocated about US$ 4.1 bil-
lion to Africa. All the African countries that have 
diplomatic ties with Beijing have received aid 
from China in the past. 
Aid is offered in the form of grants, interest-
free or concessional loans and debt relief. Turn-
key projects, like government buildings, hospi-
tals, sports stadiums, railways and roads, that 
are handed over by Chinese construction com-
panies in ready-to-use condition are well known. 
And Chinese development aid also finances 
scholarships for Africans to study in China and is 
used to send medical teams to Africa. 
Chinese aid differs from Western aid in vari-
ous important aspects. Firstly, China does not 
see itself as a donor and is not a member of the 
OECD donor community. Instead it defines itself 
as a developing country and prefers to speak of 
South-South cooperation. Aid is embedded in 
China’s foreign policy and is based on equality, 
sovereignty, non-intervention and mutual benefit. 
China does not attach political conditions, like the 
promotion of democracy or anti-corruption meas-
ures, to its aid giving. In practice, the principle of 
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mutual benefit implies that aid is part and parcel 
of an integrated package of trade, investments 
and loans, which makes it difficult to distinguish 
aid money from other financial flows. 
The ‘resources-for-infrastructure’ loans China 
has signed with Angola, DR Congo, Ghana and 
Zimbabwe are notable examples of its aid pro-
gramme. China gained experience with resource-
backed loans it concluded with Japan and West-
ern countries in the 1970s and 1980s and used 
its natural resources as collateral for loans to buy 
power plants from Japan. China is itself now of-
fering loans to developing countries. China’s US$ 
2 billion loan to Angola in March 2004, much 
against the IMF’s wishes, received a great deal 
of attention and has since been referred to as the 
‘Angola Model’. The basic idea is simple. The 
construction of infrastructure is financed through 
a loan and the revenue the country receives from 
the exports of natural resources is used as col-
lateral and to repay the loan. In most cases this 
is oil (Angola) but it may also include cocoa 
beans (Ghana), tobacco and diamonds (Zim-
babwe), sesame seeds (Ethiopia) or other natu-
ral resources. 
 DR Congo’s US$ 9 billion ‘deal of the cen-
tury’ was announced in 2007. According to the 
original agreement, US$ 6 billion would be used 
to finance the construction of 3600 km of new 
roads, 1800 km of railway lines, a hospital, 
schools and a university. The total amount of the 
loan was re-
duced to US$ 6 
billion in 2008 
under pressure 
from the IMF 
that feared that 
DR Congo’s for-
eign debt would 
become unsus-
tainable. 
In return for the loan, a joint venture, Sicomi-
nes, involving three state-owned Chinese com-
panies (with a 68% ownership share) and the 
Congolese state-owned mining company, Ge-
camines (22% ownership share), was awarded 
mining concessions for 11 million tonnes of cop-
per ore and 620 tonnes of cobalt ore. The loan 
agreement with China’s Exim Bank stipulated 
that at least 88% of the value of the goods and 
services procured must come from China and 
that one in five of the workers was Chinese. The 
US$ 6 billion loan is being partly financed by de-
velopment aid. A tranche of US$ 3 billion is on 
concessional terms and, by definition, is at a 
lower interest rate than that offered for commer-
cial loans. Exim Bank is compensated for any 
loss of interest revenue by the Netherlands Min-
istry of Finance. 
China has become one of the major financial 
backers and builders of infrastructure projects in 
Africa, due partly to the success of its resource-
backed loans. In addition, Chinese companies 
and banks have been willing to accept higher 
risks, work for lower costs and operate at lower 
profit margins than their Western competitors. 
Chinese construction companies are winning a 
large share of the international tenders issued by 
the World Bank and the African Development 
Bank, according to a World Bank report in 2008. 
Western donors have been less willing to finance 
infrastructure development in the last few dec-
ades and China has stepped in to fill the infra-
structure finance gap. 
 
Migration 
Chinese migration to Africa has grown in the 
wake of increasing trade and investment and it is 
estimated that between 700,000 and 1 million 
Chinese are living in Africa today. This migration 
is visible in the large cities where Chinatowns 
have grown up and in the Chinese shops in the 
countryside. Cut-throat competition from Chinese 
traders in retail markets has led to disquiet 
among African traders. For example, 33 vendors 
petitioned the District Commissioner in northern 
Malawi in an attempt to ban Chinese traders from 
trading in the local markets. A smaller group of 
African traders is operating in China, mostly in 
cities like Ghangzhou and Yiwu, which allows 
them to buy products at source. 
To conclude, China-Africa relations will pro-
bably intensify in the near future and result in a 
further growth in trade and investment. China’s 
increased economic influence is currently creat-
ing new responsibilities, as is clearly visible in the 
ongoing conflict over oil between Sudan and the 
new state of South Sudan. China is actively bro-
kering a peaceful solution between the two coun-
tries but armed conflict threatens to halt produc-
tion, which is bad for business and also hurts 
China’s economic interests.   
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